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Abstract. Password generators that generate site-specific passwords on
demand are an alternative to password managers. Over the last 15 years
a range of such systems have been described. We propose the first general
model for such systems, and critically examine options for instantiating
it. The model enables an objective assessment of the design of such sys-
tems; it has also been used to sketch a possible new scheme, AutoPass,
intended to incorporate the best features of the prior art while addressing
many of the shortcomings of existing systems.
1 Introduction
Passwords remain a very widely used method for user authentication, despite
widely shared concerns about the level of security they provide. There are many
potential replacement technologies, including combinations of biometrics and
trusted personal devices (e.g. as supported by protocols such as FIDO UAF [3]),
but it seems likely that it will be some time before passwords are relegated to
history. Given their current and likely future wide use, finding ways of improving
the use and management of passwords remains a vitally important issue. We
focus here on an important practical matter, namely how to make password-
based user authentication to a website both more secure and more convenient.
An important class of schemes designed to ease password use are password
managers (what McCarney [12] calls retrieval password managers). A password
manager stores user passwords and produces them when required (e.g. by auto-
filling-in login pages). Passwords can be stored either locally or on a trusted
server; most browsers provide a local-storage password manager. However, the
shortcomings of password managers have also been widely documented (see,
e.g., McCarney [12]). Passwords stored on a user platform restrict user mobility,
since they are not available when a user switches platform, e.g. from a laptop to
a tablet or phone. However, if passwords are stored ‘in the cloud’, then there is a
danger of compromise through poorly configured and managed servers, [2,8,13].
An alternative approach, which we consider here, involves generating site-
specific passwords on demand from a combination of inputs, including those
supplied by the user and those based on the site itself. A number of schemes have
been proposed but, apart from a brief summary by McCarney [12], they have
not been studied in a more general setting. The main purposes of this paper are
to (a) provide a general model for password generation schemes, and (b) use the
model to propose a new system combining the best features of existing schemes.
This is the first time these schemes have been considered in a unified way.
2 Password Generators — A General Model
Password generators simplify user password management by generating site-
specific passwords on demand from a small set of inputs. The term has also
been used to describe the generation random or pseudorandom passwords which
a user must remember; however, we use the term for schemes that generate a
password in a repeatable way. We focus on the general properties of such schemes
and options for operation. The schemes have been briefly considered previously
by McCarney [12] under the name generative password managers.
2.1 A Model
A password generator is functionality on an end-user platform to support password-
based user authentication to a remote server (assumed to be a web site). It
generates, on demand, a site-unique password for use in authentication. Clearly
this password also needs to be available to the web site authenticating the user;
the registration step, in which the password is set up, is discussed further in
section 2.3 below. A password generator has the following components.
– A set of input values is used to determine the password for a site; some must
be site-specific so the generated password is site-specific. The values could
be: stored (locally or online), based on characteristics of the authenticating
site, user-entered, or some combination of types.
– A password generation function combines the input values to generate an
appropriate password. This function must meet the requirements of the au-
thenticating web site; e.g. one web site might forbid non-alphanumeric char-
acters in a password, whereas another might insist that a password contains
at least one such character. A password generation function must therefore
be customisable.
– A password output method transfers the password to the authenticating site,
e.g. by displaying the generated password to the user.
All this functionality needs to be implemented on the user platform. There
are various possibilities for implementation, e.g. as a stand-alone application or
a browser plug-in; these issues are discussed further in section 3 below.
2.2 Examples
We next briefly outline some existing proposals for password generation schemes,
presented in chronological order of publication. The functional components of
the various examples are considered in greater detail in section 3 below.
The Site-Specific Passwords (SSP) scheme proposed by Karp [7] in 2002/03
is one of the earliest proposed examples. It generates a site-specific password by
combining a long-term (global) user master password and an easy-to-remember
name for the web site, as chosen by the user. PwdHash, due to Ross et al. [14],
generates a site-specific password by combining a long-term master password,
data associated with the web site, and (optionally) a second global password
stored on the platform. The 2005 Password Multiplier scheme of Halderman,
Waters and Felten, [4], computes a site-specific password as a function of a long-
term master password, the web site name, and the user name for the user at
the web site concerned. Wolf and Schneider’s 2006 PasswordSitter [15] scheme
generates a site-specific password as a function of a long-term master password,
the user identity, the application/service name, and some configurable param-
eters. Passpet, due to Yee and Sitaker [16] and also published in 2006, takes a
very similar approach to SSP, i.e. the site-specific password is a function of a
long-term master password and a user-chosen name for the web site known as a
petname. Each petname has an associated icon, which is automatically displayed
to the user and is intended to reduce the risk of phishing attacks. ObPwd, due
to Mannan et al. [1,9,10,11], first surfaced in 2008. It takes a somewhat different
approach by generating a site-specific password as a function of a user-selected
(site-specific) object (e.g. a file), together with a number of optional parameters,
including a long-term master password (referred to as a salt), and the web site
URL. Finally, PALPAS was published in 2015 [5]. PALPAS generates passwords
complying with site-specific requirements using server-provided password policy
data, a stored secret value (the seed), and a site- and user-specific secret value
(the salt) that is synchronised across all the user devices using the server.
2.3 Registration and Configuration
We only consider schemes whose operation is completely transparent to the
authenticating website. As a result, the ‘normal’ website registration procedure,
where the user selects a password and sends it to the site, is assumed to be used.
This means that the password generation process needs to be in place before the
registration procedure, or the introduction of a password generator will require
the user to modify their password. A possible way of avoiding the need to change
passwords is examined in section 4 below.
A password generator may need to store configuration data. Such data can
be divided into: global configuration data, i.e. values unique to the user, used to
help generate all passwords for that user, and site-specific configuration data, i.e.
values used to help generate a password for a specific site. Not all schemes use
configuration data, although building a workable system without at least some
global configuration data seems challenging. However, the use of configuration
data is clearly a major barrier to portability. That is, for a user with multiple
platforms, the configuration data must be kept synchronised across all these
platforms, a non-trivial task — exactly the issue addressed in a recent paper by
Horsch, Hu¨lsing and Buchmann [5].
3 Components of the Model
Inputs to Password Generation: The following data input types have been em-
ployed in existing schemes. A master password is a user-specific long-term
secret value; this could either be a user-entered password, i.e. entered by the
user whenever a password is to be generated, or a stored password, i.e. a user-
specific secret value stored as global configuration data. A site name is a name
for the authenticating site; this could take a variety of forms, including a user
site name, i.e., a name for a site chosen by a user, all or part of the site’s URL,
or a site-specific secret, e.g. a random value associated with the site URL. A
digital object is anything available on the user platform which could be used
as input to the password generation process, e.g. a file or a selected block of text
on the target web site. A password policy is information governing the nature
of the password generated, e.g. the set of acceptable symbols.
Generating the Password: Combining inputs to generate a password can be
done variously. All approaches involve a 2-stage process, i.e. first combining in-
puts to generate a bit-string, then formatting the bit-string to obtain a password
in the desired format. Horsch et al. [6] propose an XML syntax, the Password
Requirements Markup Language (PRML), designed specifically to enable require-
ments on passwords, as needed in the second stage, to be specified.
Password Output and Use: There are many ways in which a generated pass-
word could be transferred to the password field of a login page. Simplest is
manual copy and paste, as used by SSP [7], where the password generator
displays the password, and the user copies it to the login page. A slightly more
automated approach is copy to clipboard in which the generated password is
copied to the clipboard; for security reasons the password can be made to only
reside in the clipboard for a limited period, e.g. in PasswordSitter the generated
password is saved to the clipboard for 60 seconds before being deleted [15]. The
simplest approach for the user is probably automatic copying to the tar-
get password field; this can either be done automatically, as is the case for
PwdHash in the web page implementation [14] and the ObPwd Firefox browser
extension [9]. Alternatively it can require the user to perform an action, e.g.
clicking a specific key combination, before copying; PassPet requires the user to
click on a screen button, [16], and Password Multiplier, [4], requires the user to
double click the password field or press ctrl+P to trigger password copying.
Approaches to Implementation: A password generator can be implemented
as a browser add-on, e.g. as a browser plug-in, browser extension or
signed browser applet. Many existing password generator schemes adopt this
approach, at least as one option, including [4,14,15,16]. An alternative is to
implement the scheme as a stand-alone application, e.g. to run on a phone,
tablet or desktop. Such an approach is adopted by SSP; ObPwd, [9], is also
available as both a browser extension and a mobile app. A somewhat different
approach is to use a web-based application, either running on a remote server
or executing on the user platform as a dynamically downloaded JavaScript.
4 Improving System Operation
We next consider ways to improve password generators. In section 5 we consider
how these might be integrated into a novel system.
We have mentioned certain types of configuration data, including global data,
such as master secrets, and site-specific data, e.g. password policy values, possi-
bly specified in PRML [6]. We now introduce two new configuration data types.
– A password offset (site-specific configuration data) allows users to continue
using existing passwords after introducing use of a password generator. It
also help when specific password values are imposed on users, or when users
need to change their passwords. Addressing such requirements previously
has been problematic.
A password offset is as an input to the second stage of password generation.
A password offset induces this stage to generate a specific password value.
E.g., suppose a password policy dictates that a password must be a string of
letters and numerals, where each such character is internally represented as a
numeric value in the range 0–61. After converting the bit-string to a string of
alphanumeric characters of the desired length, and given a ‘desired password’
consisting of an alphanumeric string of the same length, the password offset
could simply be the character-wise modulo 62 difference between the two
strings1. Changing a password can be easily implemented by changing the
offset, either to a random value (randomising the password choice), or to a
chosen value if the new password value is chosen by the user.
If implemented appropriately, this offset is not hugely confidential, since it
need not reveal anything about the actual password value. Of course, if an
‘old’ password is compromised, and the old and new offsets are also revealed,
then this could compromise the new password value.
– A password generator might generate a password for one site using a different
set of input types to those used to generate a password for another site. E.g.,
a password for a mission-critical site (e.g. a bank account) might be generated
using a large set of input values, e.g. including a digital object, whereas a
password for a less sensitive site could be generated using a master secret
and site name only. Such a possibility could be captured using site-specific
configuration data, referred to here as password input parameters.
– A system might also store password reminders as site-specific configuration
data. E.g., when using a digital object as input, a user could specify a phrase
as a reminder of the chosen value (without specifying it precisely). This could
be revealed on demand via the password generator user interface.
Storing configuration data on a user platform creates a major barrier to
portability; it also poses a security risk through possible platform compromise,
although much of the configuration data we have discussed is not necessarily
confidential. The ‘obvious’ solution is to use a server to store configuration data,
or at least the less sensitive such data, much as many password managers keep
passwords in the cloud. While it would seem prudent to keep a master secret on
the user platform, all site-specific configuration data could be held in the cloud.
This type of solution is advocated by Horsch et al. [5,6].
1 Such an idea is widely implemented to enable credit/debit card holders to select
their own PIN value.
If the site-specific configuration data is all non-confidential, then there is no
need for a highly trusted server, a great advantage by comparison with some
server-based password managers. Server use need not impact password avail-
ability, since a password generator could cache a copy of the configuration data
downloaded from the server, addressing short-term loss of server availability.
5 AutoPass: A New Proposal
We now outline AutoPass (from ‘automatic password generator’), a novel pass-
word generation scheme combining the best features of the prior art together
with the novel ideas introduced in this paper, particularly those devised to ad-
dress some of the shortcomings of previously proposed schemes. AutoPass uses
all the types of input given in section 3 to generate a password, since they all
contribute to security in different ways. Following the approach of PALPAS, [5],
we also make use of a server to store non-sensitive configuration data, such as
website password policies.
5.1 Operation
Following section 2, to describe AutoPass we must define: (a) the input types,
(b) how the password is generated, and (c) how the password is output, together
with the implementation strategy. We cover these points in turn. Since we also
propose the use of a cloud service to support AutoPass operation, we also briefly
sketch its operation.
– For inputs, we propose the use of a master password, stored by the system
(as global configuration data), and a password (or PIN) to be entered by the
user. We also propose use of the first part of the URL of the site, where,
depending on the implementation, this should also be stored as part of the
site-specific configuration and used to retrieve the other site-specific data.
The master password can be held encrypted by a key derived from the user
password. We also propose the optional use of a digital object, where use
of this option is indicated in the site-specific configuration data.
– The first stage of password generation adopts a two-level hash approach,
giving some protection against brute force attacks. The second stage, i.e.
encoding, uses the AutoPass cloud service to retrieve the password policy
for the web site being visited (cf. PALPAS [5]); this policy could be encoded
using PRML, [6]. It also uses other cloud-stored configuration data, notably
the password offset, password input parameters, and password reminders
introduced in section 2.3.
– The precise option for password output and use depends on the imple-
mentation. Where possible, auto-filling the password is desirable; where this
is impossible, the copy to clipboard/paste buffer approach is advocated.
– Implementation as a browser add-on is probably the best option, not least
in giving simple access to the web page of the target site, although a range
of options may need to be pursued depending on the platform type.
We next consider the AutoPass Cloud Service, whch will be required to store
two main types of data. User-independent data will be accessed by AutoPass
users, and will include non-sensitive site-specific data, e.g. password policies.
Even if corrupted by a malicious party, it would at worst cause a denial of service.
User-specific data will only be accessed by a single user, and includes a range
of password configuration data. Although this data is not highly confidential,
access to it will need to be restricted to the user to whom it belongs, e.g. via a
one-off login process in the local AutoPass application (with access permissions
encoded in a cookie stored in the user platform).
Any cloud service has associated risks arising from non-availability; however,
this can be addressed through caching. The local AutoPass app should maintain
a copy of the data downloaded from the cloud service; since this data is not
likely to change very quickly, the cached data should normally be sufficient. To
avoid risks arising from fake AutoPass services, e.g. using DNS spoofing, the
cloud service could sign all provided data, and the AutoPass app could verify
signatures using a built-in copy of the cloud public key.
5.2 Assessment
AutoPass incorporates both the best features of the existing password generation
schemes and certain novel features, notably the use of password configuration
data (see section 4). A full assessment of AutoPass will require prototyping and
user testing. Nonetheless, we can at least consider the known issues in existing
systems and see whether AutoPass addresses these concerns.
By using a combination of stored secret and memorised password/PIN as
inputs to the generation process, we enable strong passwords to be generated
while protecting against compromise through platform loss. Use of the URL en-
ables automatic generation of site-specific passwords, and optional use of digital
objects enables passwords of varying strength to be generated without impos-
ing an unnecessarily onerous load on the user for ‘everyday’ use. URL use has
residual problems, notably if a site URL changes, but user site names also have
problems. In this connection, an advantage of AutoPass is that password offsets
enable a generated password to remain constant even if a URL changes.
Use of cloud-served password policies solves problems relating to site-specific
password requirements. Continued use of existing passwords and the need to
change passwords are addressed by use of cloud-stored password configuration
data. Password generation/synchronisation issues arising from use of multiple
platforms can also be addressed through use of a cloud service. Of course, use of
a cloud service brings with it certain availability and security risks; however, by
only storing non-sensitive data in the cloud and using caching, these problems
are largely addressed.
6 Concluding Remarks
We introduced a general model for password generation, and considered exist-
ing proposals in the context of this model. The model enables us to propose
certain new options to enhance such schemes. The operation of a novel scheme,
AutoPass, has been sketched, but has not yet been tested in practice. The next
step is to prototype AutoPass, both to verify that the underlying idea works and
also as a basis for practical user trials.
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